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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a partial summary judgment entered 
on the 5th day of May, 1983, by Judge Judith Billings in the 
Third District Court in and for the District of Salt Lake County. 
PISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court Judge ruled that the appellee Allstate 
Insurance Company, was entitled to partial summary judgment on 
question of whether or not the State Insurance Fund was entitled 
reimbursement of $18,720.00 paid into the Second Injury Fund 
"fJon the death of the appellee William J. Bliss and Veora Bliss, 
decedent, pursuant to an order of the Industrial Commission and 
Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-68. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant is asking this court to reverse the pan
1
,. 
summary judgement of the Third District Court and determine t;,e· 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-62, the State Insuran:' 
Fund is entitled to reimbursement of the $18, 720. 00 it paid w. 
the Second Injury Fund pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sectic: 
35-1-68(2) (a). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 30, 1980, Karen V. Bliss was fatally injure: 
in an automobile accident which occurred on the airport road. {R.Jc; 
She died the following day at LDS Hospital after extensive measur;o 
were taken to save her life. (R.108) 
At the time of her accident, Ms. Bliss was in the couu: 
of her employment, with the Airport Shuttle Parking, as a shutt:e 
van driver. (R.108) Airport Shuttle Parking was insured by t:e 
Utah State Insurance Fund for worker's compensation purpose,, 
(R. 108) As a result of Ms. Bliss' accident, the State Insuran> 
Fund has paid medical and funeral benefits in the sum of $10,131.4'. 
( R. 10 8) The Utah State Insurance Fund, pursuant to an oro': 
of the Utah Industrial Commission and Utah Code Ann. Sectt: 
35-1-68 2(a), has also paid $18,720.00 into the Second In]U'. 
Fund. (R. 109, 117) There is no dispute on this appeal regard, 
the State Insruance Fund's right to reimbursment on the rnedr•:: 
and funeral benefits paid as the parties stipulated to ttnt 
the District Court. (R. 167) 
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In March of 1982, William J, and Veora Bliss filed 
" ,·omplaint for the wrongful death of their daughter, Karen v. Bliss, 
i'p111st the driver of the other vehicle, Sue Ellen Dart. (R. 132) 
!11 !980, prior to the filing of the wrongful death action, the 
state Insurance Fund notified William J, and Veora Bliss, through 
their attorney, of the rights of the insurance carrier in a wrongful 
death cause of action and of the method of disbursement of proceeds 
recovered pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-63. (R. 120) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
UTAH STATUTORY AND CASE LAW MAKE IT 
CLEAR THAT THE $18,720.00 WHICH THE 
STATE INSURANCE FUND HAS PAID TO THE 
SECOND INJURY FUND rs "COMPENSATION" 
When an employee with no dependents is killed in a 
JOb related accident, the Worker's Compensation Act requires 
the employer or its insurance carrier to pay the sum of $18,720.00 
into what is called the Second Injury Fund, which is maintained 
by the State Treasurer. The State Treasurer is regarded more 
or less as the banker or custodian of the Second Injury Fund. 
Wherever the Worker's Compensation Act refers to payments to 
the State Treasurer in reality, those are payments into the Second 
In]ury Fund. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Star y. Indystrial Commission. 
615 P.2d 436 (1980) defined compensation to include payments 
made to the Second Injury Fund: 
"Compensation," as used in the amendment in the 
constitution, means the same as it is used and 
defined in the compensation act, i.e. any payment 
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required by the act to be paid to a workman or his 
dependents, or for their benefit, or into the 
State Treasury, for the special purpose of the 
compensation act. This includes disability 
payments death benefits, medical and hospital 
expenses burial expenses and payment to the 
State Treasury as proyided by the act. 
(Emphasis added) 
.l.d. at 438. 
Therefore, the money the State Insruance Fund has paid into th; 
Second Injury Fund was a "payment required by the Act to be made 
into the State Treasury." The only payments required by the 
Act to be made to the State Treasury are those payments suer, 
as the $18,720.00 herein involved which an employer or its insurance 
carrier must pay to the Second Injury Fund. Indeed the s..tQ1 
decision dealt specifically with the provision of the Utah Worker'' 
Compensation Act requiring the employer or its insurance carritr 
to make payment to the Second Injury Fund upon the death of an 
employee's wife or dependents, specifically payment of $18, 
is required by Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-68(2) (a), 
(a) If the commission has made a deter-
mination that there are no dependents of 
the deceased, it may, prior to a lapse of 
one year from the date of death of a 
deceased employee, issue a temporary order 
for the employer or insurance carrier to pay 
into the second injury fund the sum of 
$18,720. The $18,720. shall be reduced by 
the amount of any weekly compensation payments 
paid to or due the deceased between the date 
of the accident and death. Should a dependency 
claim be filed subsequent to the issuance of 
such an order and, therefore, a determination 
of dependency is made by the comwission, the 
award shall first be paid out of the sum deposited 
for credit to the second injury fund by the 
employer or insurance carrier before any 
further claim may be asserted against the 
employer or insurance carrier. In the event 
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no dependency claim is filed within one year 
from the date of death, the commission's temporary 
order shall become permanent and final. If no 
temporary order has been issued and no claim 
for dependency has been filed within one year 
from the date of death, the commission may 
issue a permanent order at any time requiring 
the carrier or employer to pay $18,720, into 
the second injury fund. Any claim for compensation 
by a dependent must be filed with the commission 
within one year from the date of death of the 
deceased. 
The Utah State Insurance Fund paid the $18,720.00, which is the 
subject matter of this litigation, into the Second Injury Fund 
pursuant to this statute. decision makes it undeniably 
clear that this $18,720.00 was compensation payable under the 
Utah Worker's Compensation Act. 
POINT II 
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 
35-1-62, THE UTAH STATE INSURANCE FUND 
IS ENTITLED TO FULL REIMBURSEMENT FOR ANY 
AND ALL COMPENSATION PAID INCLUDING ANY 
AMOUNT PAID INTO THE SECOND INJURY FUND 
The State Insurance Fund is entitled to full reimbursement 
of the $18,720.00 it has paid into the Second Injury Fund in 
reference to Karen Bliss' death. Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-62, 
which follows, makes this explicitly clear: 
35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by 
wrongful acts of persons other than employer 
officer, agent, or employee of said employer--
Rights of employer or insurance carrier in 
Notice of intention to proceed against third 
party -- Right to maintain action not involving 
employee-employer relationship -- Disbursement 
of proceeds of recovery. When any injury or 
death for which compensation is payable under 
this title shall have been caused by the 
wrongful act or neglect of a person other than. 
an employer. officer. agent, or employee of said 
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employer. the injured employee, or in case of 
death hjs dependents. may claim compensation 
and the injured employee or his heirs or personal 
representative may also have an action for 
damages against such thjrd person. If compen-
sation is claimed and the employer or insurance 
carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation, 
the employer or insurance carrier shall become 
trustee of the cause of action against the third 
party and may bring and maintain the action 
either in its own name or in the name of the 
injured employee, or his heirs or the personal 
representative of the deceased, provided the 
employer or carrier may not settle and release 
the cause of action without the consent of 
the commission. Before proceeding against the 
third party, the injured employee, or, in case 
of death, his heirs, shall give written notice 
of such intention to the carrier or other 
person obligated for the compensation payments, 
in order to give such person a reasonable 
opportunity to enter an appearance in the 
proceeding. 
For the purposes of this section and 
notwithstanding the provisions of section 
35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs 
or personal representative may also maintain 
an action for damages against subcontractors, 
general contractors, independent contractors, 
property owners or their lessees or assigns, 
not occupying an employee-employer relationship 
with the injured or deceased employee at the 
time of his injury or death. 
If any recovery is obtained aaainst such 
third person it shall be disbursed as follows; 
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, 
including attorneys' fees, shall be paid and 
charged proportionately against the parties as 
their interests may appear. Any such fee 
chargeable to the employer or carrier is to be 
a credit upon any fee payable by the injured 
employee or, in the case of death, by the 
dependents, for any recovery and against the 
third party. 
(2) The person liable for compensation 
payments shall be reimbursed in full for all 
payments made less the proportionate share 
of costs and attorney's fees provided for 
6 
in subsection Ill. 
. . (3) The balance shall be paid to the 
inJured employee or his heirs in case of 
death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy 
in full any thereafter accruing 
against the person liable for compensation. 
(underlining added) 
This statute, particularly subparagraph 2, clearly 
and unambiguously mandates reimbursement to the "person liable" 
for "compensation" in full. Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-68(2) (a) 
and Star V· Industrial Commission, 613 P.2d 436, make it clear 
that the $18,720.00 is "compensation". In this case, Karen 
Bliss' employer, through the State Insurance Fund, is the "person 
liable" for that compensation. Therefore, the Utah State Insurance 
Fund should be reimbursed in full for the $18,720.00 which it 
has paid to the Second Injury Fund in conjunction with Karen 
Bliss' death. Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-62 outlines the disbur-
sement order in cases such as this in explicit detail thus that 
order should be amended only by the legislature if at all and 
not by Court decisions. 
The District Court Judge relied upon Oliveras 
v. Caribou-Four Corners. Inc., 598 P.2d 1320 (1979). Undoubtedly 
Ql1veras does impact upon third party actions under the Worker's 
Compensation Act. However, Oliveras does not deny the employer 
and/or the insurance carrier their statutory rights created by 
the clear language of Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-62, to recover 
C'01npensa ti on expended as a result of the wrongdoing of a tortfeasor • 
-,.t,P money that the State Insurance Fund bas paid into the Second 
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Injury Fund constitutes a statutory special damage independer: 
of the damages the heirs may claim on their own behalf. 
State Insurance Fund would not have been required to pay t·,. 
$18,720.00 but for the wrongful doing of the tortfeasor. 
Certainly, Oliveras prohibits the employer and/or fo 
insurance carrier from divesting non dependant heirs of the,, 
general damages. However, it would be unreasonable to interprr, 
Oliveras as denying the insurance carrier their statutory right: 
clearly defined by Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-62. Those 
rights are in reality an item of special damages. Such an inter-
pretation of the decision, in essence, would create a cause o'. 
action on the one hand while rendering it remediless on the 
In ad di ti on, to permit that result would allow the tortfeasjr 
a windfall benefit from his wrongdoing. In this case, the wrongdoin: 
of the tortfeasor has resulted in a loss to the State Insurance 
' 
Fund of $18,720.00. This item of special damage is separate 
from the claims of the non-dependent heirs in this case and thr 
State Insurance Fund's right to reimbursement should not be confuse: 
with the heirs' right to recover. The $18,720.00 which the Ut3' 
State Insurance Fund has paid into the Second Injury Fund i: 
a separate item of damage for which the tortfeasor is statutorii: 
obligated to reimburse the Fund. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah State Insurance Fund in the instant case 
entitled to reimbursement for the $18, 7 20. 00 which it has P' 
the State Treasurer for deposit in the Second Injury Fund. 
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payment to the State Treasurer is tantamount to a statutorily 
,,eated special damage. Oliveras, limited the right of reimbursement 
0 nly in the sense that the insurance carrier and/or the employer 
, annot divest non-dependent heirs of their general damages. Oliveras, 
however, cannot be read to completely eliminate the right of 
reimbursement of special damages as is clearly delineated in 
the worker's Compensation Act. This interpretation of Oliveras 
insures the rights of the heirs under the wrongful death statute 
while also protecting the rights of the employers and/or insurance 
carriers created by the Worker's Compensation Act. Any other 
interpretation will permit the tortfeasor to escape the full 
consequences of his wrongdoing and, in reality, nullify Section 
35-1-62. To adopt the interpretation of opposing counsel would 
amend the statute by court ruling rather than by legislative 
act. 
Appellant, the Utah State Insurance Fund respectfully 
requests this court to reverse the Third Judicial Courts granting 
of partial summary judgment and enter an order entitling the 
Utah State Insurance Fund reimbursement from the tortfeasor for 
the $18,720.00 which it has paid into the Second Injury Fund. 
DATED THIS of October, 1983. 
BLACK & MOORE 
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